1st discussion post: Part I: Explain at least one strength and one limitation of


1st discussion post: Part I: Explain at least one strength and one limitation of a distributed homeland security intelligence production.
Properly ran fusion centers are a strength of a distributed homeland security intelligence production. The DHS uses fusion centers to help intelligence flow out of agencies in Washington, DC into local and state departments (DHS, 2018). Since every agency plays a critical role in preventing terrorism it is crucial that there is a flow of information from the federal government to state, local, tribal, and territorial partners. When intelligence is distributed correctly, local and state law enforcement agencies can better notice indications and warnings of probable attacks and are able to put preventative measures in place (DHS, 2018). For example, the FBI may be looking into a member of ISIS that is currently in Atlanta based off a tip they have received, so they pass that information to the Georgia Information and Sharing Analysis Center (Georgia’s Fusion Center). Georgia’s fusion center then brings in local agencies who are able to conduct surveillance in which they discover, there is a terrorist attack planned a month from now. Due to the cooperation and flow of information between federal, state, and local agencies, that potential terrorist attack in the example would be able to be stopped. The strength set in the example was that because the homeland security intelligence production was evenly distributed through the fusion center, a terroristic act did not occur. A limitation present within the homeland security intelligence production is predictive policing. Predictive policing involves using computers to analyze when and where crimes are predicted to occur based off geographical areas (LeCates, 2018). However, this form of policing often leads to social and civil rights concerns, as some ethnic groups are targeted more than others.
Part II: Provide at least one specific suggestion for improvement as it relates to the limitation you found within the homeland security intelligence production.
A suggestion for the improvement of predictive policing is to use the intelligence-led policing model. The intelligence-led policing model is a law enforcement program that collaborates intelligence operations with police accountability, problem-solving policing, and information sharing (LeCates, 2018). Not only does this style of policing focuses on preventing crimes, it works best when intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, and homeland security agencies work together as a joint effort (LeCates, 2018). Based off statistics within the past ten years, intelligence-led policing has been said to be effective in decreasing the number of crimes occurring (LeCates, 2018).
Part III: Locate the nearest Fusion Center to you via the U.S. Homeland Security link. Once you find your local Fusion Center, discuss the specific mission of that Fusion Center. If you are in a foreign country, pick a Fusion Center near where you last resided in the United States or your hometown.
I am currently located in Japan, so I used the state of Georgia, as it was my last place of residence. The Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC) is the primary repository for criminal and counterterrorism intelligence information for the state of Georgia. GISAC’s mission is to dedicate resources to prevent terrorism and to provide support to Georgia law enforcement during criminal investigations (GA Information, n.d). Their mission is accomplished by coordinating local, state, and federal agencies within Georgia such as the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, Georgia Emergency Management Agency/Homeland Security, Georgia Sheriff’s Association, and the Atlanta Federal Bureau of Investigation Joint Terrorism Task Force to name a few (GA Information, n.d). Collaborations within the fusion centers produces products such as threat assessments and bulletins to assist with public safety, emergency management, and law enforcement investigations (GA Information, n.d). The collaboration between agencies allows for intelligence to be gathered, analyzed, and shared in a timely manner.
Discussion post 2: Part I: Explain at least one strength and one limitation of a distributed homeland security intelligence production.
There has been significant progress building capacity, standardizing practices, and sharing information, both horizontally and vertically to support foreign operations, perimeter protections, and homeland security and law enforcement (HS&LE) requirements. The President was commissioned with creating the Intelligence Sharing Environment (ISE), designating its organization and management structure, and determining and enforcing the policies and rules to govern the ISEs content and usage. This effort required a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated environment that connects existing systems and builds upon existing systems capabilities yielding strengths of this coordinated intelligence production such as: Intelligence Science and Technology Partnership`s- these strong private-public sector partnerships allows for enormous intelligence advantage for the nations decision makers and warfighters.
IN-STeP empowers the IC S&T enterprise and collaborated partners to properly inform investment decisions through synergetic intelligence-related research efforts (ODNI, n.d). Furthermore, Intelligence Ventures in Exploratory Science and Technology (In-Vest) is a crucial strength of the decentralized ISE as it stimulates groundbreaking public and private sector research that is vital to ensuring strategic and tactical intelligence to provide the private sector with early signals of advanced technologies that the IC is anticipated to require permitting industries to invest appropriately in support of the IC`s Future needs. I would also consider the National Intelligence Council to be a strength of the distributed homeland security intelligence production, as the council bridges the intelligence and policy communities’ gap, drawing experts from the government, academia, and the private sector to work on critical issues under the auspices of the ODNI.
However, weaknesses permeate the homeland security intelligence production by avenues of inconsistent practices, lack of unity of efforts across levels of governments characterizing the domestic landscape in need of bi-directional information sharing. Other weaknesses include but are not limited to the fact that the public-private sector component of the infrastructure protection mission is not receiving the high priority that is commensurate with its vital importance to the Nation’s economic health and security. While the Federal Intelligence Community serves multiple customers and missions, sharing information with the owners and operators of critical infrastructure does not receive high priority, either in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Intelligence Community at large, or Federal and State governments; and, Today, the multiplicity of Federal players, their diverse missions and roles, and myriad “rules-of-the-road” for how and where intelligence can be shared stymie owners and operators of critical infrastructure in their ability to contribute to and use intelligence information. As a result, engagement through trusted personal relationships remains a primary means of facilitating the flow of needed intelligence information.
Although there is evidence that some fusion centers existed before the formation of the DHS, they became formalized under the aegis of state-level DHS offices in direct response to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Put simply, after the attacks of 9/11, there was widespread consensus within the intelligence community that various agencies had not been able to work in concert to ‘connect the dots’ and prevent the attacks. Fusion centers are one response to this identified problem. According to a congressional report on the subject: ‘the DHS State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative is key to Federal information sharing efforts and must succeed for the Department to remain relevant in the blossoming State and local intelligence community’ (Monahan & Palmer, 2009). However Fusion Centers are a cause for several concerns namely: their ineffectiveness, particularly given the financial expense, the statistical unlikelihood of terrorist attacks, and the pressing need for other law enforcement support; the potential for mission creep, where the functions of fusion centers expand beyond their originally intended purposes to encompass things like all-hazards preparedness; and the violation of civil liberties, especially through racial profiling or First Amendment violations.
Conversely, the National Intelligence Sharing Plan, a cohesive plan to improve the nation’s ability to develop and share criminal Intelligence fell short as the need for assuring institutionalization of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan existed alongside the need to increase availability of information, from classified systems to local and state law enforcement agencies, for the prevention and investigation of crime in their jurisdictions (Office of Justice Program, n.d).
Part II: Provide at least one specific suggestion for improvement as it relates to the limitation you found within the homeland security intelligence production.
I would recommend assuring priority of infrastructure protections through presidential policy directives. The White House should additionally employ current or new partnership mechanisms for senior executives in the private sector to engage their government counterparts to facilitate a truly national approach that leverages public-private resources for large-scale, persistent threats. Additionally, as it regards Fusion centers failures, enhancing fusion centers capabilities ought to be considered coupled with ensuring civil liberty protections. The DHS will need to guide fusion centers to establish an information sharing function with owners and operators as part of a critical infrastructure protection and resilience mission.t must be noted that not all fusion centers align with critical infrastructure assets or operate under State laws and policy that allow or encourage the integration of critical infrastructure information. Regardless, DHS should support through funding, personnel, training, technology, and analytic tools the development of a bi-lateral intelligence sharing system. Finally, develop an action plan to implement these recommended actions. DHS should coordinate the preparation of an Intelligence Sharing Action Plan that describes in detail how Federal agencies plan to implement the recommendations. The Action Plan should clearly outline the steps that the Administration will take to successfully implement each accepted recommendation, including a schedule, the responsible organization, key milestones, and performance metrics. Further, DHS should present the Action Plan to the NIAC and provide regular updates on progress at least once per year.
Part III: Locate the nearest Fusion Center to you via the U.S. Homeland Security link. Once you find your local Fusion Center, discuss the specific mission of that Fusion Center. If you are in a foreign country, pick a Fusion Center near where you last resided in the United States or your hometown.
Given that I am in High Springs Florida the closest Fusion Center near me is the Florida Fusion Center (FFC) headquartered in Tallahassee Florida and is a state designated, which means that this center is a Primary fusion center as it provides information sharing and analysis for an entire state. The Florida Fusion Center is the highest priority for the allocation of available federal resources, including the deployment of personnel and connectivity with federal data systems. This center began operations in 2007 and was designated the head of Florida fusion centers in 2008.
Discussion post 3: Part I: Explain at least one strength and one limitation of a distributed homeland security intelligence production.
First it is important to define what distributed intelligence production actually means. According to Gruver, (2017) distributed Intelligence systems are based from the ideal that cooperative organized agents are able to achieve higher level goals and flexibility vice independently handled and specialized tasks. An advantage or strength in distributed homeland security intelligence production is that the DHS can rely on its 22 internal agencies to gather intel and insight on any one given situation. This ability for reach back to 22 internal components is also what I would consider a weakness or limitation. It goes back to last weeks discussion about classification issues and communication limiting the information sharing thus the intelligence production. Kept in one place with one agency significantly simplifies the process yet limits the intel fusion value.
Part II: Provide at least one specific suggestion for improvement as it relates to the limitation you found within the homeland security intelligence production.
To increase communication within the DHS there needs to be effective and strong leadership coupled with a common core culture. Resilience et al, (2013) states that these building blocks are critical to a successful organization and a necessity if programs are to succeed in the future. Leadership, communication and culture are intimately interwoven and the DHS has effectively portrayed deficiencies in all three areas (Resilience et al., 2013). Leaders enable culture through their actions, how they react in critical situations, how they allocate resources, how they act as role models etc. (Resilience et al., 2013). Culture will support the workforce norms, build resiliency, encourage values and expectations that are consistent and advance that same culture (Resilience et al., 2013). Resilience et al, (2013) explains that culture supports a resilient workplace and resilient leaders create the tipping points that change communication and the organization itself.
Part III: Locate the nearest Fusion Center to you via the U.S. Homeland Security link. Once you find your local Fusion Center, discuss the specific mission of that Fusion Center. If you are in a foreign country, pick a Fusion Center near where you last resided in the United States or your hometown.
The Central Florida Intelligence Exchange located in Orlando Florida is the closest Fusion Center to me. This particular fusion center supports nine counties and is an all-crimes all hazards fusion center going by the acronym of CFIX. Their mission statement says that this particular fusion center provides information and knowledge in the form of actionable intel to both policy makers and decision makers alike (Orange County Sheriff’s Department, 2017). As with pretty much any other fusion center this one exists to collect, analyze, and disseminate intel in order to deter, detect, disrupt or deny both terrorist and criminal activity (Orange County Sheriff’s Department, 2017).
-Paul
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